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Asia's Security Environment 
From Subordinate to Region Dominant System 
MUTHIAH ALAGAPPA 
To provide the context for investigating the roles of nuclear weapons and their 
implications for regional security and stability, this chapter maps Asia's present 
security environment and likely changes in that environment. lt advances four 
propositions. First, contemporary Asia's security environment is fundamentally 
different from that of the Cold War period when Asia was a subordinate security 
region penetrated and dominated by the ideological and strategic confrontation 
between the United States and the Soviet Union. Today, Asia has become a core 
world region with distinctive economic, normative, and institutional features. 
The dynamics of security in Asia are increasingly shaped by the interaction of 
interests and priorities of states in the Asian security region. Conflict formation, 
management, and resolution are grounded largely in regional and local dynamics. 
Extraregional actors are involved but their salience derives from their interaction 
with Asian state and nons tate actors on issues of mutual concern. 
Second, Asia's security environment is likely to substantially alter over the next 
two to three decades. Escalation or resolution of regional conflicts (Taiwan, Ko-
rea, and Kashmir) and regime change in countries like China, Indonesia, and 
Pakistan could bring about interaction change at a subregional level. They may 
also trigger broader changes. More fundamental system-level consequences, how-
ever, are likely to result from two ongoing trends. One is the rise of Asian powers, 
their quests for power, status, and wealth, and differing visions of regional order 
set in a context of the continuing desire of the United States to remain the pre-
eminent power in Asia. The sustained rise of Asian powers is likely to result in 
gradual structure change and make relative gain considerations and strategic com-
petition more significant. China's rise would pose the most significant challenge 
to the U.S.-dominated security order in Asia making Sino-American relations the 
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primary security dynamic with regionwide security implications. Sino-Japanese 
and Sino-Indian relationships would also become consequential. How these re-
lationships evolve and interact with each other, and the "eventual" configuration 
of relations among major powers, however, remain uncertain. Although several 
outcomes are possible, I argue that a gradual transition from a U.S.-centered sys-
tem to a loose informal balance-of-power system with the de facto purpose of 
preventing domination of Asia by a single power is likely. Although the U.S. 
power and influence in Asia will decline, it will remain the lead power over the 
next two decades. 
The continuing dynamism of Asian economies and their increasing integra-
tion into regional and global economies is another important driver of change. It 
creates a dynamic that reinforces as well as counteracts strategic competition. As 
their economic power increases, Asian countries would be able to devote greater 
~esource_s to build military capabilities and other capacities to pursue compet-
mg fore1gn policy objectives. This could intensify strategic competition. Grow-
ing eco~~mic integration and interdependence could, on the other hand, temper 
compet1t10n and modify adversarial relationships by creating alternative lines of 
interaction and vested interest in peace and stability. Regional cooperation and 
rule-governed interaction for mutual economic benefit could have spillover ef-
fects and reinforce peace and security. Interaction of the two drivers of change 
makes for a complicated strategic picture that defies single theory explanation and 
prediction. The Asian strategic situation is more akin to that of complex interde-
pendence characterized by cooperation, competition, and conflict. 
Third, the chapter posits that although it will not be free of tension and will 
be characterized by a significant degree of uncertainty and hedging, the gradual 
t~ansition from a U.S.-centered system to an informal balance-of-power system is 
hkely to be relatively peaceful. The primary attention of Asian states in the next 
decade or more would be internally directed toward economic growth, modern-
ization, state and nation building, and addressing domestic challenges. Maintain-
ing a stable international environment that is conducive to the pursuit of these 
national goals and preventing international interference in their domestic affairs 
will be a primary foreign policy objective and determinant of security order. This 
does not imply that states will not seek to build national power and influence, 
alter the status quo, or engage in strategic competition. These pursuits will be 
moderated by other concerns, priorities, and deep interest in stability. Finally, the 
chapter argues that military force will remain an important instrument of policy 
in the interaction of major powers, but largely in defense, deterrence, and assur-
ance roles, not in aggression. States will seek to avoid strategic confrontation and 
full-scale war but at the same time hedge against uncertainty and unanticipated 
developments. In strategic matters, the behavior of major powers will approxi-
mate more closely to defensive realism than offensive realism. 
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From a Subordinate to a Region Dominant Security System 
Over the past century, Asia has traveled from a position of imperial subordina-
tion and fragmentation to a position of substantial strength, with several Asian 
states having the power to influence regional and global affairs. From the sixteenth 
century to the mid-twentieth century, international politics in Asia was domi-
nated by the intrusion of Western powers (much earlier in South and Southeast 
Asia than in Northeast Asia) and later by imperial Japan (from the late nineteenth 
century)_! The colonial and semicolonial era ended the indigenous interstate sys-
tems that had operated in Asia and transformed the nature and boundaries of 
Asian political units and their economies. Upon independence, thes~ countries 
(though some had long histories, almost all were new as modern nation-states) 
were integrated into the global international system still dominated by the West. 
For much of the Cold War, Asia was a subordinate security region penetrated 
and dominated by the ideological and strategic confrontation between the two 
superpowers. 
Cold War Asia: A Subordinate Security Region 
A loose Asia-wide regional security system emerged for the first time in history 
upon decolonization, which coincided with the onset of the Cold War. The in-
tense zero-sum ideological and military confrontation between the United States 
(leader of the so-called free world) and the Soviet Union (leader of the socialist 
world), with Europe as the focal point, infused and shaped the Asian security 
environment. The intrusion of superpower confrontation created connections 
among Asian powers and subregions that otherwise would have been relatively 
isolated. At the same time, the Soviet-American struggle polarized Asia into two 
rival blocs, with China initially allying with the Soviet Union, and Japan deeply 
bound to the United States. In this context, some Asian countries, with India as 
a leader, opted for nonalignment. With the onset of the Sino-Soviet conflict, and 
Washington's adoption of the Guam doctrine, China aligned with the United 
States (and Japan) against the Soviet Union. After the 1962 Sino-Indian war, New 
Delhi gradually leaned toward Moscow while Washington, Tokyo, and Beijing 
drew closer. Local conflicts such as the many communist insurgencies in South-
east Asia, the Taiwan Strait conflict, the Vietnam wars, the Cambodian conflict, 
and to a lesser degree the India-Pakistan conflict were all penetrated, overlaid, or 
transformed by the conflicts and rivalries between the superpowers. 
No Asian power could stand alone. India's initial attempt to develop a posi-
tion independent of the bipolar confrontation was not successful. All three Asian 
powers (China, Japan, and India) chose alliance or alignment with one of the two 
superpowers. In the 1950s and early 1960s, China allied with the Soviet Union 
to deal with the threat posed by the United States. The latter perceived China as 
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presenting the foremost security threat to the free world in Asia and had threat-
ened a nuclear attack against it during the Korean War. However, Moscow's 
reluctant support of China during the Korean War and the 1958 Taiwan crisis, 
China's growing concern that an alliance with the Soviet Union might compro-
mise its national interests and complicate military planning, fear of abandonment 
in the event of a crisis, and emerging tensions with Moscow argued the case for 
self-reliance, impelling Beijing to accelerate its nuclear program, leading to the 
1964 atomic and 1967 hydrogen bomb tests (Goldstein 2000: 62-90). However, 
despite the tests, as a second-rank power still lacking an effective deterrence capa-
bility, and now perceiving its primary security threat as emanating from Moscow, 
Beijing entered into a strategic alignment with Washington. It stressed the com-
mon Soviet threat to free ride on the U.S. strategic deterrent. Only in the 1980s 
did China begin to assume a more independent security posture, mediating the 
impact of the bipolar confrontation on the strategic situation in Asia. 
Under American tutelage and subsequent concern with the Soviet threat, Ja-
pan relied on its security alliance with the United States, including the nuclear 
umbrella of that country. However, unlike Washington, Tokyo did not perceive 
a security threat from Beijing and worried about becoming entrapped in the U.S. 
policy of containing China. Tokyo's concern eased with the development of the 
U.S.-China rapprochement and strategic alignment in the 1970s against the Soviet 
Union, which Japan perceived as the primary threat. As observed earlier, India's 
effort to position itself apart from the bipolar confrontation was not successful. 
New Delhi leaned toward Moscow because of its concern with China that be-
came heightened after India's defeat in 1962, the U.S. pro-Pakistan position in the 
India-Pakistan conflict, and Sino-American rapprochement. India and the Soviet 
Union entered into a de facto alliance in 1971. Although like China, but much 
later, India took sides in the Cold War in pursuit of its own national interests, 
it was less deeply involved in the bipolar confrontation. India's nuclear weapon 
program had its roots in the confrontations with China and Pakistan. The drivers 
of the Indian nuclear program have been the subject of much debate, with some 
analysts arguing the primacy of domestic variables, and others positing greater 
salience of the international security rationale (Jones and Ganguly 2ooo; Tellis 
2001: 20-1 15). Rajesh Rajagopalan notes in this volume that a strong case can be 
made that the need for and direction of the Indian nuclear weapon program was 
driven in large part by the security rationale, while its pace may have been influ-
enced by limited technological capabilities in the 196os and by domestic political 
and bureaucratic factors. 
Pakistan more explicitly engaged in the Cold War through its alliance with the 
United States and later alignment with China, but its principal focus was India, 
not China or the Soviet Union. Pakistan's nuclear weapon program was initi-
ated in the aftermath of its crushing defeat by India in the 1971 war, the ensuing 
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dismemberment ofPakistan, and the peaceful Indian nuclear test in 1974. Subse-
quent development of the program had to do with military domination of politics 
in Pakistan and Islamabad's desire to counter and compete with India. The de-
velopment of Pakistan's program, however, benefited from Chinese assistance in 
the context of the Sino-Indian conflict and U.S. diplomatic and military support 
during the Cold War. Perceiving Pakistan as a close ally, U.S. support included 
turning a blind eye to Pakistan's nuclear weapon program. 
Unlike the India-Pakistan conflict, which was only marginally connected to 
the Cold War confrontation, the conflicts across the Taiwan Strait and on the Ko-
rean peninsula were produced by or became deeply enmeshed in the Eold War. In 
the conflict between the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) and the Guomindang 
or Nationalist Party (KMT) over which was the rightful government of China, 
the United States backed the KMT and became committed to defending Taiwan, 
while the People's Republic of China (PRC) relied on the Soviet Union. On the 
Korean peninsula, the Cold War divided the peninsula. The United States backed 
the Republic of Korea (ROK, or South Korea), and China and the Soviet Union 
backed the Democratic People's Republic of Korea (DPRK, or North Korea). 
Taiwan and South Korea became pawns in the game of great power competition. 
Their survival was contingent on the commitment of Washington. Both coun-
tries feared abandonment by the United States. 
The Chinese nuclear test in 1964, U.S. refusal to bomb China's nuclear facili-
ties, and virtual "abandonment" of Taiwan by Washington in its rapprochement 
with Beijing in the 1970s motivated Taipei to embark on an indigenous nuclear 
weapon program (Mitchell 2004). Under intense U.S. pressure, in 1976 Taipei 
committed itself not to acquire or engage in reprocessing. Despite this, Washing-
ton discovered in 1988 that Taiwan was within a year or two ofbuilding a nuclear 
bomb. Again under intense U.S. pressure, Taiwan agreed to conclusively and 
verifiably end the program. Similarly, the 1969 Guam doctrine (which sought to 
shift the burden of defense responsibility to Asian states) and the Sino-American 
rapprochement in 1971-72 (which marginalized Taiwan) created much insecurity 
in Seoul and led to the institution of a covert nuclear weapon program (Pollack 
and Reiss 2004). This program was ended under U.S. pressure, which included 
the threat of abrogation of the bilateral security treaty. In both cases, erosion of 
the credibility of the U.S. security commitment was the key variable in the deci-
sions to embark on indigenous nuclear weapon programs. 
From the preceding brief discussion, it is evident that the loose Cold War Asian 
security system was subordinate to and deeply penetrated by global bipolarity 
and the dynamics of superpower competition. Conflict formation and manage-
ment, the responses of regional states and relations among them, and the security 
policies of Asian states (including nuclear policies) were heavily influenced by a 
global structure over which they had little control and by a set of largely external 
42 MUTHIAH ALAGAPPA 
dynamics. Except in maritime Southeast Asia, which was the only Asian subregion 
until the 198os to witness the development of indigenous multilateral subregional 
cooperation, all other regional efforts were led by one of the two superpowers and 
took the form of alliances or strategic alignments. During much of the Cold War 
era Asia was a subordinate region and a theater of several hot wars that had their 
primary drivers elsewhere. 
Asia Becomes a Core World Region 
Beginning in the mid- to late-198os Asia emerged as a distinct core world re-
gion. Economic dynamism of Asian countries, growing interdependence among 
them and with other power centers, forging of a shared regional normative struc-
ture among Asian states, and development of regionwide institutions have been 
crucial drivers and indicators of regional distinctiveness and the emergence of 
Asia as a core world region. 
Dramatic economic growth of East Asian countries (Japan, South Korea, 
Taiwan, and Hong Kong) and certain Association of Southeast Asian Nations 
(ASEAN) countries (Singapore, Thailand, Malaysia, and Indonesia) in the 1970s 
and 1980s combined with growing intraregional economic interaction (trade, 
investment, and manufacturing) centered on Japan provided the initial impetus 
for regionalization and recognition of East Asia as a significant economic region 
(Katzenstein and Shiraishi 1996). By 1990, East and Southeast Asian countries mi-
nus China had become major trading partners of the United States and the Euro-
pean Union. In the late 1980s, it was conventional wisdom to assert that with the 
meteoric rise of Japan and the newly industrializing countries (NICs), the center 
of the word economy was shifting to the Pacific Basin (Gilpin 1987). The opening 
up of the Chinese economy in 1979 and its sustained rapid growth since then has 
further increased the economic weight of Asia. Along with and rivaling Japan, 
China has become a key engine of growth in the world. 
Economic stagnation in Japan for over a decade and the 1997-98 Asian financial 
crisis tarred the miracle economy image, but Asia has since recovered. The pace of 
growth of many Asian economies has slowed but is still advancing at a respectable 
rate. China continues to grow rapidly, and Japan appears to be recovering from its 
long stagnation. The gradual liberalization of the Indian economy beginning in 
1991 and sustained high growth rates since 2003-04 adds to the economic weight 
of Asia. In current prices (using U.S. dollars), East Asian countries and India ac-
counted for about 22 percent of the world's gross domestic product (GDP) in 
2005. In purchasing power parity (PPP) terms the share was about 35 percent. Asia 
accounted for about 50 percent of world growth that year. The Economist Intel-
ligence Unit's "Foresight 2020" estimates that Asia's share of the global economy 
will increase to 43 percent by 2020. Collectively, Asia accounted for more than 
30 percent of total world trade in 2001. It is also an important destination for 
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private capital flows, including foreign direct investment, a major consumer of 
energy, and is fast becoming the manufacturing and offshore base for the world. 
In 2005, East Asian countries and India collectively held over USsr.6 trillion in 
foreign exchange reserves. Several Asian countries (Japan, China, South Korea, 
and India) have or are becoming significant economic actors regionally as well as 
globally, with implications for trade, investment, energy sourcing and consump-
tion, and the environment. The participation of Asian countries in addressing 
regional and global problems has become crucial, as for example in negotiating 
world trade arrangements and addressing the problem of global imbalances. 
Concurrently, Asian economic interdependence has increased intraregional 
merchandise trade from 42 percent in 1990 to 50 percent in 2004. lntraregional pro-
duction networks and investment have contributed to the increase in regional 
interdependence. And there is a desire in the Asian policy community for greater 
regional economic interdependence (Petri 2006). Numerous bilateral and multi-
lateral trade agreements focused on the region are being negotiated or planned; 
new regional dialogues involving ASEAN, China, Japan, South Korea, and other 
countries are being explored; and there is growing interest in regional financial 
arrangements, including a common currency after the 1997-98 financial crisis. 
Asia's economic interaction with the rest of the world, especially the United States 
and Europe, has deepened. Through investments, energy exploration and pipeline 
contracts, trade and trade-related loans, aid, and political support for certain re-
gimes, Asian countries (Japan and increasingly China) are also making significant 
inroads in the Middle East, Russia, Latin America, and Africa. It is possible to 
argue that growing economic significance in the aggregate does not matter since 
Asian countries, unlike their European counterparts, do not act collectively. This 
is partially valid. My point, however, is that Asian countries, individually and 
collectively, have moved or are moving to the core of the international economic 
system with power to shape the patterns of trade, investment, production, and the 
structure and governance of regional and global economies. 
Along with economic growth and increasing economic interdependence, the 
development of indigenous subregional and regional institutions has contributed 
to the emergence of Asia as a distinct region. Initially limited to Southeast Asia, 
regional organizations have become more widespread and numerous. Asia is now 
home to several inclusive subregional organizations including ASEAN (formed 
in 1967), the South Asian Association for Regional Cooperation (SAARC, 1985), 
and the Shanghai Cooperation Organization (SCO, 2001), which has its origins 
in the Shanghai Five that was formed in 1996. Certain countries desire to convert 
the ongoing Six-Party Talks on North Korea into a security forum for North-
east Asia. Beginning with the formation of the Asia-Pacific Economic Coopera-
tion (APEC) forum in 1989, Asia has also witnessed the development of several 
regionwide organizations including the ASEAN Regional Forum (ARF, 1994), 
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the ASEAN Plus Three (APT, 1999), and the East Asia Summit (EAS, 2005). The 
region is also home to several significant U.S.-led military alliances (U.S.-Japan, 
U.S.-South Korea, and U.S.-Australia). 
Not only is Asia home to several regional organizations, but over the years it 
has also developed a shared normative framework. The core norms of this frame-
work can be traced to the Five Principles of Peaceful Coexistence articulated by 
India and China in 1955 and which were incorporated into the final Bandung 
communique of the twenty-nine nation Asia-Africa Conference held that year. 
The 1976 Treaty of Amity and Cooperation in Southeast Asia, which has since 
been signed and ratified by all ten Southeast Asian countries, reaffirms those prin-
ciples. Interaction among signatories, according to the Treaty, is to be guided by 
the following values: mutual respect for the independence, sovereignty, equality, 
territorial integrity, and national identity of all nations; the right of every nation 
to lead its national existence free from external interference, subversion, or coer-
cion; noninterference in the internal affairs of one another; settlement of differ-
ences or disputes by peaceful means; renunciation of the threat and use of force; 
and effective cooperation. The principles of the 1976 Treaty have been endorsed 
by the ARF, and the Treaty has been acceded to by several key non-Southeast 
Asian states including China, India, Japan, Russia, and Australia. Accession to the 
Treaty has been made a precondition for membership in the EAS. The principles 
have also been incorporated into the ASEAN Charter adopted in 2007. Similar 
principles inform the charters ofSAARC and the SCO. 
Certain observers, especially from the West, tend to disparage Asian regional 
organizations as mere talk shops with little substantive content and the normative 
framework as pro forma echoes of the United Nations (U.N.) Charter with little 
meaning, as the Asian states have failed to translate these norms into binding rules 
of behavior and, in fact, have frequently violated them (Jones and Smith 2007). 
The cynical view of a shared normative framework was indeed justified in the 
early postindependence period that coincided with the Cold War when Asian 
countries did frequently violate the norms they publicly articulated. However, 
in time the norms have become deeply imprinted in the mind-set of the Asian 
political elite across Asia-contributing to a shared set of norms that increasingly 
influences the behavior of states. Although Asian regional organizations suffer 
several shortcomings, especially in comparison with European ones, and their con-
tribution may appear limited on the basis of rationalist and community-building 
criteria, they perform several invaluable functions. These include creating a sense 
of regional awareness and a sense of common good; providing a forum for dis-
cussion of regional disputes, common concerns, and issues; ameliorating bilateral 
and regional tensions; constraining the use of force; providing opportunities for 
cooperation and exercising a collective voice in international forums; and most 
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significantly in socializing elites and in constructing a regional normative frame-
work (Acharya 2003; Alagappa 2003b). 
Asian regional institutions, however, have not played a transforming role ex-
cept perhaps in Southeast Asia. And even in this subregion the much-touted trans-
forming role of ASEAN is questionable. As Jones and Smith (2007) argue, ASEAN 
and related organizations have been long on community-building visions but very 
short in realizing them. A long-range vision of an East Asian community has been 
under discussion for some time now but there is little agreement on substantive 
content, footprint, membership, and the suitable institutional vehicle for pursu-
ing such an objective. Competing national interests appear likely tG hamper such 
efforts. Nevertheless, Asian regional institutions have become a visible sign of 
internal and international recognition of Asia as a distinct region. External actors 
like the United States and Europe now engage in regular dialogue with Asian 
regional institutions. 
Post-Cold War Asia: A Distinct Regional Security System 
Concurrent with the emergence of Asia as a core economic region and the 
development of regional norms and organizations, the security system in Asia has 
become more distinct and autonomous. Some see regional distinctiveness in the 
structure of the Asian system and its organizing principle. David Kang (2003), 
for example, posits that Asia is becoming China-centric and that hierarchy rather 
than anarchy is the organizing principle of the China-centered Asian system. 
Robert Ross (1999, 2003) posits that East Asia is already a bipolar system, with 
China dominant in the East Asian land mass and the United States dominant in 
maritime East Asia or the rimland. I disagree with these positions. The system 
in Asia is not Sino-centric, and sovereignty-conscious East and Southeast Asian 
states do not accept hierarchy or Chinese dominance. They seek good relations 
with China but several also seek to hedge, balance, and constrain China. There 
is no return to history. The view that a hierarchic Sino-centric order existed in 
historical times or that it was always hierarchic is also contested (Ledyard 1983; 
Rossabi 1983; Yang 1968). The present system in Asia is also not bipolar. China has 
become an economic powerhouse, and its diplomatic influence is increasing, but 
it is not a comprehensive power. It is still far behind the United States, especially 
in military power but also in several other dimensions of power. Though enjoying 
economic and diplomatic success, Beijing has limited positive ideational capital 
for regional political leadership. With erosion in the ideological underpinning of 
its Marxist-Leninist political system, Beijing itself is in search of a viable politi-
cal modeL Those who see East Asia as Sino-centric or bipolar often ignore Japan, 
which still has the second largest economy in the world, a strong conventional 
military capability, and is closely allied with the United States. My view is that 
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global unipolarity also pervades Asia. Although Asia is home to several large pow-
ers, some of which may in due course substantially dilute the power and influence 
of the United States and challenge its primacy, for now none is able to compete 
with the United States. 
The Asian regional system is distinctive not because of its structure or organiz-
ing principle but because of the centrality of regional and local dynamics in con-
flict formation, management, and resolution. Unlike during the Cold War, when 
internal and international conflicts in the region were overlaid by the Soviet-
American ideological and strategic confrontation, regional actors and their inter-
ests now drive conflict formation and resolution in Asia. Extraregional actors are 
involved in certain conflicts, but their salience derives from their interaction with 
Asian state and nonstate actors on issues of mutual concern. They do not override 
indigenous actors and dynamics. Settlement or resolution of security problems in 
Asia now hinges on addressing indigenous roots rather than merely external ones. 
At the same time, there is no overarching regional security dynamic that perme-
ates all or even most security challenges in Asia. Even when Asian states confront 
common security challenges, each internal and international conflict has its own 
dynamics that are only marginally linked to others. The ensuing discussion of the 
contemporary security challenges in Asia demonstrates the regional and local basis 
of conflict formation and resolution. 
Internal Security Challenges. Internal conflicts over political identity and legit-
imacy have been a prominent feature of the Asian political-security landscape 
since 1945. Asia has witnessed numerous civil wars, armed insurgencies, coups 
d'etat, revolutions, and regional rebellions. Many have been protracted; several 
have had far-reaching implications. The civil war in Pakistan, for example, led 
to the breakup of the country in 1971. During the Cold War, many internal con-
flicts were penetrated and in some cases transformed by the overarching global 
security dynamic, with the two superpowers supporting rival groups and at times 
engaging directly in war as for example in Vietnam and over Cambodia. With the 
termination of the Cold War, the global strategic overlay has disappeared. There 
is no new global or regional equivalent. 
Asian countries continue to witness numerous internal conflicts over political 
identity and legitimacy, many of which are rooted in contestations over center-
elite-led nation- and state-building projects. Although there are common features 
across countries, each internal conflict has its own dynamic that has to be addressed 
on its own merit. For example, there are interconnections among the conflicts in 
Nepal, Northeast India, Bangladesh, and Burma, or in the Pakistan-Afghanistan 
border area. These interconnections are rooted in ethnic and religious ties, com-
mon ideology, or simply in pragmatism, and facilitated by porous borders and 
weak states. Islamic international terrorism appears to be a connecting thread for 
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internal conflicts in Afghanistan, Pakistan, India (Kashmir), and Bangladesh in 
South Asia, and to a lesser degree in Indonesia and the Philippines in Southeast 
Asia. Although international connections are important and must be ad,dressed, 
these conflicts are essentially grounded in local political and socioeconomic griev-
ances: Without them the international dimension would be irrelevant. This is not 
intended to downplay the significance of international connections but to place 
them in proper perspective to highlight the salience of local and subregional dy-
namics that must be addressed in conflict management and resolution. 
International Terrorism. Likewise terrorism, which has long been a concern for 
several Asian states, is rooted in local conditions. Terrorist methods have been 
employed by subnational groups in their struggle to gain autonomy or indepen-
dence from the states in which they were located. In some cases these groups had 
the support of similar groups in neighboring countries and at times were sup-
ported and used by certain neighboring states. The international connections of 
these groups, especially to the Middle East and Pakistan, were highlighted and 
became more evident after 9/n. International nonstate actors and their causes are 
important in establishing regional and global networks, but to be successful they 
must connect with local groups, their causes, and objectives. 
Since South Asia adjoins Southwest Asia and is close to the Middle East, terror-
ism is a major concern in this subregion, with the nexus of the Taliban, Al-Qaeda, 
and Pakistan as the central focus. When it was in power in Afghanistan, the Tali-
ban provided a safe haven for Al-Qaeda, which is believed to be seeking weapons 
of mass destruction. Pakistan had supported the Taliban regime as a way of in-
fluencing developments in neighboring Afghanistan and to secure strategic depth 
in the event of a war with India. Although dislodged and disrupted, the Taliban 
and Al-Qaeda appear to be regrouping in Afghanistan and along the ungoverned 
Afghanistan-Pakistan border. Islamabad has since joined the war on terrorism, 
but it also sees militancy and terror as a useful instrument of policy in its conflict 
with New Delhi. India has borne the brunt of militant insurgent movements and 
terrorism in South Asia. Cross-border terrorist activities have reached deep into 
India, raising the potential for major armed hostilities between India and Paki-
stan. Confronted with terrorist attacks in its heartland and in the areas bordering 
Afghanistan, Islamabad now appears to be reconsidering its approach to militant 
and terrorist movements with sanctuary in its territory. 
In Southeast Asia there is an international dimension to terrorism, but the 
terrorist threats in the Philippines and Thailand are linked to separatist strug-
gles waged by minority communities. In Indonesia, Singapore, and Malaysia, the 
concern is with the regional Jemaah Islamiya (JI), which, according to terror-
ism experts, seeks to establish Islamic states and an Islamic caliphate in maritime 
Southeast Asia (Abuza 2003; Vaughn et al. 2005). At present, however,JI appears to 
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be in disarray. Although the nature, intensity, and purposes of the terrorist threat 
may vary, it is perceived as a significant threat by several Asian governments. 
Some states have jumped on the bandwagon to serve their parochial political in-
terests. Sri Lanka, for example, seeks to deal with the ethnic minority problem 
under the label of terrorism. China brands Uyghur resistance movements as ter-
rorists, while the Philippines seeks to label the Moro Islamic Liberation Front that 
is seeking autonomy for the Muslims as a terrorist group. 
Although nonstate transnational actors have always existed, certain contem-
porary actors (such as Al-Qaeda and JI) and the challenge they pose for national 
and international security is specific to the contemporary era. These actors not 
only challenge the very foundation of a system based on sovereign states but, in 
addition, their nonterritorial organization and activities, their attempt to acquire 
sophisticated and highly destructive weapons, and their use of high-technology 
communications and information methods make it exceedingly difficult for states 
to detect, deter, and defeat them. 2 The threats posed by such organizations are 
likely to continue for some time, but on their own they are unlikely to have sys-
temic implications. The greater danger lies in the possibility that radical Islamic 
groups may acquire or seize state power in majority Muslim countries like Paki-
stan, Bangladesh, or Indonesia. Such developments would have subregional im-
plications in South and Southeast Asia and connect these subregions more closely 
to the Middle East. 
A related concern is the threat of nuclear terrorism. In Asia, the concerns cen-
ter largely on Pakistan and North Korea and to a much smaller degree on India. 
In the case of Pakistan, the international concern centers on the unstable nature 
of the Musharraf regime and the fear that in the event of political instability its 
nuclear weapons and facilities may come under the control of Islamic extremist 
political parties or military elements sympathetic to the anti-West, anti-India, 
anti-Israel causes of radical Islamic groups; or that radical Islamic groups on their 
own or in collusion with military elements could take control of certain nuclear 
facilities (Basrur and Rizvi 2003). In India the concern is with possible terrorist 
attacks on nuclear facilities or that terrorists may target nuclear weapons in stor-
age or in transit. India and Pakistan (the latter with U.S. assistance) appear to 
have taken a series of measures to reduce their exposure by safeguarding nuclear 
facilities and securing command and control arrangements. In the case of North 
Korea, as discussed earlier, the concern is that Pyongyang may aid or sell nuclear 
technology to terrorist groups. 
Concern about illicit trafficking of nuclear and other radioactive material, 
though traditionally directed at the former Soviet states, has become an important 
issue in Asia, especially in relation to South and Southeast Asia (Prosser 2004). Of 
particular concern is the proliferation network of A. Q. Khan, which is believed to 
have done enormous damage to international peace and stability and to the non-
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proliferation regime (Albright and Henderson 2005). It is believed that without 
assistance from this network Iran would not have been able to develop a uranium 
enrichment capability. There is also suspicion that the network may have helped 
Al-Qaeda obtain nuclear secrets before the fall of the Taliban regime. 3 Revela-
tions of the A. Q. Khan proliferation network and of trade in nuclear weapon-
related dual-use technologies have highlighted issues relating to nuclear safety and 
security. Clearly there are regional and global dimensions that must be addressed. 
At the same time, conflict management, including settlement, hinges on address-
ing the core local and subregional issues. This is evident, for example, in the effort 
to deal with the North Korean problem through the Six-Party Talks, 
Territorial Disputes. Asia is witness to numerous territorial disputes on land and 
at sea (Blanchard 2003; Fravel 2005; Wang 2003). Nearly every country has had 
a border dispute with its neighbor(s), and several still continue to do so. China, 
India, Russia, and Japan have long-standing territorial disputes with each other. 
The disputes between China and India and between China and Vietnam led to 
major wars. The territorial dispute between China and the Soviet Union resulted 
in a military clash in 1968. Most territorial disputes have their origins in ill-
defined boundaries by colonial powers or in the contestation of colonial demarca-
tions. Maritime territorial disputes are relatively recent, with their origins in the 
interpretation and implementation of the Law of the Sea Treaty regime and in 
competing historical claims. Some of these disputes in the East and South China 
Seas have resulted in occasional military dashes. The territorial conflicts on land 
and at sea were not deeply enmeshed in the Cold War strategic dynamic. Settle-
ment in some cases and continuation of others demonstrate the importance of 
domestic and bilateral dynamics.4 In the present context, territorial disputes other 
than those considered crucial for state identity and sovereignty appear unlikely to 
result in major wars. In certain cases, as for example between China and India, 
conflicting parties have entered into bilateral negotiations to manage and possibly 
resolve their dispute; in some other cases (between Malaysia and Indonesia, and 
between Malaysia and Singapore) certain territorial disputes have been submitted 
for international adjudication. 
Identity and Sovereignty Conflicts. Of the continuing security challenges in Asia, 
the long-standing identity and sovereignty conflicts involving Taiwan, Korea, and 
Kashmir are the most significant from a regional perspective. During the Cold 
War these conflicts, especially those across the Taiwan Strait and on the Korean 
peninsula, were deeply enmeshed in the Soviet-American confrontation. Over 
time the nature of these conflicts has been transformed and their dynamics have 
become largely regional and local. 
Regionalization and Localization. Beginning in the late 1980s the conflict be-
tween the KMT and the CCP over the right to rule China was transformed into a 
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conflict between China and Taiwan over the identity and sovereignty of Taiwan. 
Asserting that Taiwan is a part of China, Beijing claims sovereignty over that 
island state. Its goal is to unify Taiwan with China if necessary through the use 
of force. With the transfer of KMT leadership to native Taiwanese leaders and 
democratization, both major Taiwan political parties (the Democratic Progressive 
Party [DPP] and the KMT) have rejected unification but are split on the issue of 
independence. The survival of Taiwan as a de facto sovereign state rests on the 
security guarantee of the United States that was initially given in the context of 
the Cold War. After the normalization of U.S. relations with China in 1979, that 
security guarantee became implicit but was demonstrated when the need arose. 
Washington adheres to a ~ne-China policy; it is firmly opposed to unilateral 
change in Taiwan's status or status change through the use of force. 
The Korean conflict was produced and deeply embedded in the structure of the 
Cold War. Since then it has undergone two transformations. The termination of 
the Cold War completed the localization of the conflict, making the North-South 
dimension more pronounced. Chinese and Russian support for North Korea, es-
pecially the likelihood of their military intervention in support of Pyongyang, 
declined dramatically. Washington continues to be committed to the security 
of South Korea, but its commitment is not linked to larger strategic concerns. A 
further transformation of the conflict resulted from the isolation of North Korea, 
its weaknesses as a state, its collapsing economy, and Washington's characteriza-
tion of North Korea as a "rogue state." The focus of the conflict shifted to the 
survival of the North Korean regime and its nuclear weapon program. Although 
the nuclear problem has commanded much attention in recent times, settlement 
of the Korean conflict will have to address the North-South and the DPRK-U.S. 
dimensions of the conflict, as well as the survival of the Kim Jong 11 regime and 
prevention of economic collapse in North Korea. 
The dynamics of the Kashmir conflict have always been local. The Cold War 
did not transform the conflict as it did the Taiwan Strait and Korean conflicts. The 
Cold War did, however, enable Pakistan to mobilize massive military aid and dip-
lomatic support from the United States and China. Likewise, the termination of 
the Cold War did not have a significant impact on the nature of the conflict, but it 
did affect external support for Pakistan, especially from the United States. While 
the conflict itself has altered little, there have been important changes in actors, 
mode of pursuing the struggle, and in the armaments of the conflicting parties. 
The emergence of militant movements against India with sanctuaries in Pakistan, 
especially those that seek independence from both India and Pakistan, compli-
cates bilateral relations and a future settlement. These militant movements could 
be spoilers in the ongoing peace dialogue. Guerrilla war and terrorism, with the 
support of Pakistan, have become the primary means of waging the struggle over 
Asia's Secu1ity Envi1onment 51 
Kashmir and the broader struggle against India. Over the years, India and Paki-
stan have become nuclear powers, with Pakistan threatening to use nuclear weap-
ons should India undertake conventional military operations against Pakistan. 
Conflict Escalation and Peaciful Settlement. Notwithstanding the transformation 
in dynamics, all three conflicts continue to manifest themselves in large-scale 
confrontational military deployment. Despite periodic dialogues among conflict-
ing parties, they have defied settlement. Although they appear stable and under 
control, these conflicts are crisis prone; overt hostility cannot be ruled out. Should 
such a crisis escalate and develop into a full-scale war, it would affect regional 
security and stability. Peaceful settlement would also have regional ~ecurity impli-
cations. This is especially the case with the conflict across the Taiwan Strait. 
Should China initiate hostilities without provocation, the United States and 
possibly Japan would almost certainly become involved.5 The threat and use of 
nuclear weapons may feature in the escalation of hostilities. A war would also cre-
ate a firm line of enmity, with implications for the entire region. Sino-American 
and Sino-Japanese relations would spiral downward, making the United States-
Japan security treaty an instrument to contain China, whose international image 
would be tarnished. There would be serious domestic political repercussions in 
China, especially if it initiated hostilities and suffered a reversal. Involvement in 
overt hostilities would have a dramatic impact on Japanese domestic politics as 
well. The U.S. reputation as a reliable security partner and its security engagement 
in Asia would be tested. In the lead-up to overt hostilities, should it perceive ero-
sion in the commitment of Washington to its survival, the Taiwanese government 
could attempt a nuclear option as it did earlier. Though Beijing would almost cer-
tainly respond to Taiwan's bid for a nuclear option, the nature of that response and 
the U.S. reaction to Taiwan's quest for nuclear weapons and to Beijing's response 
are all in the realm of conjecture. In the event of hostilities, other regional states 
would be forced to take sides, and the region could become polarized. 
A peaceful settlement would also have far-reaching consequences, although 
the implications would hinge on the type of settlement reached: unification 
with China, a confederal arrangement, or an independent Taiwan. An amicable 
settlement would remove a contentious issue in U.S.-China relations, making 
for greater cooperation and stability between the two countries and in East Asia. 
However, it is unlikely to eliminate U.S. anxieties about a rising China and vice 
versa. With the Taiwan issue settled, China's military development would re-
quire a new rationale, raising questions about the new focus of Chinese military 
development and its use of military power. The purpose and nature of the U.S. 
security commitment and military presence in Asia might also be up for debate in 
U.S. domestic politics and in the region, with the distinct possibility iliat it could 
undergo retrenchment. 
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Likewise, escalation and resolution of the conflicts on the Korean peninsula 
and over Kashmir would have wider implications but more limited than the Tai-
wan conflict. Should North Korea start a war, the United States and possibly 
Japan would come to the aid ofSouth Korea. China, Russia, and other regional 
states are unlikely to become involved militarily. Although such a war may be 
limited, it would be devastating for the two Koreas and strain if not antagonize 
Sino-American and Sino-Japanese relations. Peaceful conflict resolution would 
also set in train developments that could have strategic consequences in Northeast 
Asia, for the U.S.-South Korea alliance, and the U.S. security role in that sub-
region. Even if the alliance continues, U.S. military presence and commitment 
would likely be scaled back substantially. There is also the possibility of strate-
gic realignment of South Korea with China (Chung 2005). The future of North 
Korea's nuclear weapon program and Pyongyang's relations with China and South 
Korea in the event of a settlement are difficult to predict. Retrenchment of the 
U.S. security commitment and its military presence in South Korea, and closer 
relations between South Korea and China, might cause anxiety in Japan, but the 
implications drawn by Tokyo are likely contingent on the state of Sino-Japanese 
and Sino-American relations. 
On the India-Pakistan conflict over Kashmir, it is unlikely that any outside 
power or regional state would intervene militarily, especially as both protagonists 
are now nuclear weapon states. Escalation, if it occurs, would be vertical to the 
nuclear level. International concern would focus on preventing such escalation. 
Although rather unlikely, a Kashmir settlement would remove a contentious issue 
in India-Pakistan relations, but it would not end Islamabad's aspiration to be an 
equal of India. Internal and external balancing (including in the nuclear arena) 
with external assistance from China and the Islamic world would continue to be 
a feature of Pakistan's policy. However, this would not preclude cooperation with 
India. A settlement in Kashmir would transform the bilateral relationship from 
one of pure enmity to one with mixed motives and payoffs; the combination of 
amity and enmity would make possible both cooperation and competition. This 
could augur well for cooperation in South Asia. 
A Complex and Changing Strategic Landscape 
The preceding discussion highlighted the contemporary security concerns-
a mixture of traditional and nontraditional challenges. The Asian security land-
scape is likely to further alter. As indicated in earlier discussion, regional security 
dynamics could be affected by regime change in key countries such as China, 
Indonesia, and Pakistan. Significant change would also flow from escalation or 
resolution of the three key regional conflicts (Taiwan, Korea, and Kashmir). Sig-
nificant regional level systemic changes are likely to flow from the rise of Asian 
Asia's Security Environment 53 
powers and from the economic dynamism and growing economic interdepen-
dence among them. The rise of Asian powers is likely to affect system structure 
and increase the salience of strategic competition, while growing economic inter-
dependence is likely to make for a more complex strategic environment in which 
lines of amity and enmity are less clear-cut. 
Rise of Asian Powers 
Over the next two decades, the continued rise of Asian powers is likely to 
gradually alter system structure away from unipolarity toward bipolarity or multi-
polarity, or some combination of them. A new unipolar system with China at the 
center is unlikely in that time frame. As the rise of China would pose a signifi-
cant challenge to the U.S.-dominated security order in Asia, Sino-American rela-
tions would become the primary security dynamic with regionwide implications. 
Sino-Japanese and Sino-Indian relations could also become more consequentiaL 
A net effect would be greater strategic competition and new alignments among 
major powers or extensions of existing ones. Both developments would broaden 
the boundaries of the Asian security region. This outlook is premised on two 
conditions. One is that the economic growth of Asian powers will continue. The 
second condition is that the United States will continue to be engaged in Asia. 
It is possible to envisage scenarios (internal socio-political upheavals, severe eco-
nomic setbacks, and involvement in war) that could curtail or derail Asian eco-
nomic growth. The prediction in the 1980s that Japan would become number one 
failed to materialize.6 The present assessment appears to be that Asian economies, 
including China, may suffer reversals (like the 1997-98 Asian financial crisis or 
the decade-long stagnation in Japan) but their fundamentals support continued 
economic growth (Asian Development Bank 2007; World Bank 2007). The pace, 
however, may slow as their economic base becomes bigger. Similarly the U.S. 
military presence and security role may alter but the United States is unlikely to 
disengage from Asia, which will remain important to its security and prosperity. 
Gradual Transition from Unipolarity 
In earlier discussion, I posited that global unipolarity also pervades Asia and 
that none of the Asian powers are presently in a position to compete with the 
United States. The strong alliance relationship between the United States and 
Japan, which still has the world's second largest economy, makes it even more 
difficult for China to compete with the dominant position of the United States 
in Asia. At the same time, the economic and diplomatic power of China has 
increased. Together with Russia, at times with the support of certain European 
powers, and through its position and influence in global and regional organiza-
tions, China has attempted to constrain the effects of American dominance. This 
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have not attempted a counter-balancing coalition; even if it tries, China will not 
succeed in constructing an Asian coalition against the United States. 
Over time, China's own power is likely to increase substantially with con-
sequences for the regional structure. China is expected to become the world's 
second largest economy by about 2015 and challenge the United States for the 
lead by about 2040 (Wilson and Purushothaman 2003; also see Table I-I). China's 
growing importance in the global and regional economies would enable it to 
structure them in ways that increase its influence. Beijing would be able to devote 
even more resources to research and development and to military modernization. 
It is not unreasonable to expect China's growing economic power to translate into 
hard and soft power as well as structural power. In about two decades, China's 
comprehensive power would become structurally significant, diluting American 
dominance and influence in Asia. Chinese power would be even more consequen-
tial if the U.S.-Japan alliance were to loosen or end. With erosion or termination 
of that alliance, it would be difficult for the United States to maintain military 
dominance in Asia. However, a normal and autonomous Japan and a growing 
India would also constrain China, preventing the domination of Asia by a single 
power and trend the region in the direction of a multipolar system. It is highly 
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likely that the distribution of power in Asia will alter, but it would be in a gradual 
fashion and defy neat classification. In about two decades from now, the unipolar 
features of the Asian security system would significantly diminish; features of 
bipolarity and multipolarity would become more prominent. Competing quests 
for wealth, power, status, and influence between rising Asian powers and the 
predominant United States and among the Asian powers themselves would make 
strategic competition a more significant feature of the Asian security landscape. 
Sino-American Relations: Central Regional Security Dynamic 
America's preponderant power and the public goods it provides are widely ac-
knowledged in Asia. Its security roles include creating a stable balance of power 
through its interaction with the major Asian powers (anchoring Japan and encour-
aging it to become a full security partner, engaging and balancing China to make 
it a responsible stakeholder, and promoting and integrating India as an impor-
tant power); reassuring and controlling allies (Japan, South Korea, and Taiwan); 
deterring aggression and defusing conflicts across the Taiwan Strait and on the 
Korean peninsula; defusing and preventing escalation of the India-Pakistan con-
flict; securing sea lines of communication; countering proliferation ofWMD; and 
combating terrorism. Japan, Australia, Taiwan, and many ASEAN countries have 
actively sought and support U.S. security commitments in Asia. At the same time, 
America's unparalleled military power-so visibly demonstrated in the first Iraq 
war, Kosovo, Afghanistan, and the invasion phase of the second Iraq war--has 
touched raw nerves, creating apprehensions even in China and Russia. Gener-
ally, U.S. predominance and its deep involvement in Asia, which now extend 
to South, Southwest, and Central Asia, have both positive and negative security 
implications for a wide range of countries. All major Asian powers seek cordial 
relations with the United States, although mistrust, apprehension, and dissatisfac-
tion also characterize specific bilateral relations. 
Dissatisfaction with American dominance is perhaps most evident in China. 
Beijing's concern with such dominance is twofold. One, it perceives American 
hegemony and its vastly superior military power as having negative consequences 
for China's security-on internal stability, its goal of unifying Taiwan with the 
PRC, and the effectiveness of its strategic deterrent. Two, it perceives the Ameri-
can system of alliances, especially the strengthening of the U.S.-Japan security 
treaty and the idea of a democratic coalition among the United States, Japan, 
India, and Australia as working against its own interest, further widening the 
gap between the United States and China and enhancing the position of its Asian 
neighbors (Japan and India). Washington's de facto policy of multiple centers of 
power in Asia works against the opportunity for Beijing to become the primary 
Asian pole. 
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There are competing views on the implications of a rising China for the United 
States. 8 Some argue that gains for China in Asia have not necessarily been at the 
expense of the United States (Sutter 2005, 2006). Others posit that China is are-
visionist state that cannot be socialized. It is already a threat or will become one 
soon (Elwell, Labonte, and Morrison 2006; Mearsheimer 20or; Menges 2005).9 
Concerned about the uncertainty that surrounds the future behavior of China and 
concerned about preserving its primacy, Washington has responded to the rise of 
China with a mix of policies encapsulated in terms like "responsible stakeholder" 
(Zoellick 2005) and "favorable balance of power" (National Security Strategy 
2002, 2006).10 These policies seek to engage, socialize, restrain, hedge, and bal-
ance China with the goal of making it an economic partner in an international 
system underpinned by the values advanced by Washington. Presently there is no 
clear trend in U.S.-China relations. Neither partnership nor conflict is inevitable 
(Friedberg 2005). The relationship may well continue to exhibit mixed features 
for a considerable time until China becomes a truly comprehensive power and 
strong enough to pose a major systemic challenge to the United States. 
Although China may not rival the United States for some time to come, Sino-
American relations are already an important driver of security in Asia. The con-
flicting Taiwan policies of the two countries underlie the most serious security 
issue in Asia. The growing power and influence of China and the U.S. response to 
these developments have contributed among others to a stronger U.S.-Japan secu-
rity alliance, closer U.S.-India relations, strategic partnership between China and 
Russia, and China's policy to diversify and improve relations with major pow-
ers. Beijing has sought to strengthen its position and influence in Asia through 
a series of measures including active diplomacy (so-called charm offensive), pro-
viding support for countries like North Korea and Burma that have been casti-
gated by the United States, a higher profile in regional multilateral arrangements, 
advocacy of Asia-only regional organizations that would effectively exclude the 
United States, condemnation of U.S.-led alliances as remnants of the Cold War, 
Japanese participation in them as inimical to Asian regionalism, and active pursuit 
of China-centered economic arrangements.11 China is also upgrading its military 
capability, including modernizing its nuclear arsenal to ensure a robust deterrent 
force against the United States. 
The importance of Sino-American relations for regional security is almost 
certain to grow. Should the United States forge a strategic condominium with 
China, Beijing would become regionally more influential. Its need to forge strate-
gic partnerships with Russia and Europe, and accommodate other Asian powers, 
would be a lesser priority. Japan and India would have less flexibility and may have 
to come to terms with China on its terms. Though not impossible, the circum-
stances that would impel a strategic condominium (as opposed to ad hoc or issue-
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specific cooperation) between the predominant power and a fast-rising power are 
difficult to imagine. 
A confrontational situation is less difficult to envisage. China sees the U11ited 
States as its principal security concern and has instituted measures to reduce and 
counter that concern.U Certain quarters in Washington already perceive a rising 
China as an economic challenge and possibly a military threat. The 2006 Qua-
drennial Defense Review, for example, states: "Of the major and emerging pow-
ers, China has the greatest potential to compete militarily with the United States 
and field disruptive military technologies that could over time offset traditional 
U.S. military advantages absent U.S. counter strategies" (Office of tlte Secretary 
of Defense 2oo6b: 29). An open Sino-American confrontation would create a 
clear line of enmity that would certainly bring the present quiet strategic compe-
tition to the fore. In that situation, Japan may seek to ally even more closely with 
the United States and be inclined to engage more in balancing behavior than in 
reaching accommodation with China. The positions of India and Russia in the 
eventuality of a Sino-American confrontation are more difficult to predict. It is 
possible India may lean toward the United States, and Russia may move closer 
to China. Much will hinge on their state of relations with the United States and 
China and their interests at stake. 
At the same time, it is important to recognize that there are very few situations 
that could lead to a strategic confrontation between the United States and China. 
Conflict over Taiwan is an obvious situation; severe economic recession and si-
multaneous disputes on several fronts may be another. Even in these cases there 
are checks, balances, and cushions to resolve or manage disputes and prevent an 
inexorable slide toward confrontation. Strategic condominium and confrontation 
are extreme and unlikely scenarios. More likely is a relationship characterized by 
cooperation and competition but with competition for relative power and influ-
ence becoming more pronounced. That competition can significantly affect the 
pattern of relations among Asian powers. 
Sino:Japanese Relations: Competing Aspirations 
For the first time in history, Northeast Asia is home to two major powers-
China and Japan-that are distrustful of each other and have competing interna-
tional aspirations and visions of regional order. Despite strong economic relations, 
political and security relations between the two countries have soured since the 
late 1990s (Ming Wan 2006). China is unwilling to accept Japan as an equal. 
Beijing uses its power and influence to compete with and marginalize Tokyo's 
regional initiatives, deploys the history card to cast Japan in an unfavorable light, 
and depicts Japan's close relations with the United States as inimical to Asian 
regionalism. Yet Beijing recognizes that denying Tokyo its "proper" place and 
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role risks adversarial relations with that country, which would push Japan further 
into the embrace of the United States, widen the power gap between the United 
States and itself, and entrench the United States in Asia. Isolation and estrange-
ment could also impel Tokyo to seek security partnerships with other countries 
such as India and Australia and seriously explore the nuclear option. Although 
Japan is still unlikely to acquire nuclear weapons in the foreseeable future, it is no 
longer taboo to speak about amending the constitution or to discuss nuclear issues 
(Hughes 2007). 
Apprehensive of the rapid growth in Chinese power and influence, Tokyo does 
not want to be dominated by Beijing. It aspires to a status and role befitting its 
economic and technologicai power. In East Asia, Japan seeks to order the region 
on the basis of certain values that include democracy, human rights, and market 
economic principles, and to broaden the membership of Asian regional organiza-
tions to include India, Australia, and the United States. The implicit intention is to 
dilute the power and influence of China. The growing perception of threat from a 
China that is deemed to be seeking hegemony in Asia and the North Korean mis-
sile and nuclear tests have helped strengthen the Japanese conservative elite, which 
is spearheading the quest for a larger international political and security role. 
The United States, especially the administration of George W. Bush, has sup-
ported Japan's quest for a larger international role to create a favorable balance of 
power in Asia (Armitage and Nye 2000, 2007; National Security Strategy 2002, 
2006). Except for a brief period in the early 1990s, Tokyo has all along viewed 
the security treaty with the United States as the cornerstone of its security policy. 
Growing concern about a rising and nationalist China, as well as North Korea, 
has renewed emphasis on the U.S.-Japan security treaty. Despite Japanese con-
cerns of entrapment and a desire for greater autonomy, the U.S.-Japan security 
treaty is likely to endure and become more equal. Tokyo is also likely to deepen 
security relations with Australia, forge strategic relations with India, and reach out 
to countries in Southeast Asia. 
Although there are fundamental differences, it is not certain that Sino-
Japanese animosity will result in rivalry and confrontation. Some have argued that 
Sino-Japanese relations are heading toward "a period of dangerous rivalry," but 
others posit the "emergence of a new equilibrium ... based on common interests, 
on frankness, and mutual respect and understanding" as more likely (Mochizuki 
2005). Still others posit that Japan may engage in closer collaboration with China 
as both share common interests (Pyle 2007: 337-38). Richard Samuels (2007) pos-
its that Japan would opt for a strategy that is "not too dependent on the United 
States or too vulnerable to China." A likely scenario is that Japan's relations with 
China would be characterized by cooperation and competition, and through in-
cremental steps Japan would emerge as a comprehensive power with consequence 
for the balance of power in Asia.13 The competitive dimension of Sino-Japanese 
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relations for status and leadership in East Asia and the world, rising nationalism 
in both countries, and their lingering suspicions of each other grounded in con-
tradictory readings of history give rise to a security dynamic that is conseoiJ.uential 
not only for East Asia but for the broader region. 
Sino-Indian Relations: Quiet Competition, Growing Relevance 
As two large countries sharing a common but disputed b()rder over which 
they went to war in 1962, China and India could be viewed as rivals in a struggle 
for security, wealth, and status (Tellis 2004).14 China has a border dispute with 
India, has been concerned about possible Indian support for Tibetan resistance, 
and views India as a potential rival for power and influence in Asia. Though not 
explicitly stated, Beijing's India strategy appears designed to bolster Pakistan, with 
the purpose of containing India, and taking advantage oflndia's troubled relations 
with its neighbors to limit New Delhi's regional influence. For New Delhi, China 
has been a direct security concern since the eruption of the border dispute in the 
late 1950s and especially after the 1962 war. Equally worrisome has been the de 
facto China-Pakistan alliance that enables Pakistan to engage in open confronta-
tion with India. Indian perception of China as a security threat has waxed and 
waned, but a consensus "moderate-realist" view appears to have emerged. That 
view seeks to resolve differences and invigorate economic relations with China 
but at the same time be vigilant and develop China-related military capabilities 
(Hoffmann 2004). 
The underlying mistrust between the two countries has contributed to what 
has been termed "quiet competition" (Frazier 2004). The dramatic increase in 
China's power and influence in the region has caused envy and apprehension but 
has also been a stimulant and model for India. India's sustained economic growth 
,. at higher rates since 1991, its move to overt nuclear weapon state status after 1998, 
and the burgeoning U.S.-India relationship, along with international recognition 
of India as a major power, are beginning to alter the image of India in China. In 
recent years, the two countries have engaged in high-level exchanges and political 
dialogue to resolve the border dispute, promote bilateral trade and investment, 
and downplay differences. 
Direct consequences of the earlier enmity between the two countries are the 
Sino-Pakistani strategic alignment and the actual or perceived Chinese intrusion 
into the Indian sphere of influence. During the Cold War, the implications of 
this dynamic were largely confined to South Asia, although it did play into the 
Sino-Soviet conflict and Soviet-American confrontation. The growing economic 
and military reach of India into Southwest and Southeast Asia, China's growing 
reach into nearly all of Asia, and American and Japanese concerns with China are 
broadening the relevance of India and the state of the Sino-Indian relationship. 
Washington seeks to help India become a great power. India, too, sees benefit in 
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building better relations with the United States. Beginning in the second term 
of the Clinton administration, U.S.-India relations have steadily improved, with 
the Bush administration broadening cooperation to include the strategic arena. 
The burgeoning U.S.-India relations coupled with India's growing power and 
a foreign policy that emphasizes improved relations with all major powers have . 
increased the profile oflndia in the region. Observing the improvement in U.S.-
India relations, and in pursuit of its own foreign policy and security objectives, Ja-
pan has begun to build strategic understanding and relations with India. Southeast 
Asian countries, for their part, increasingly view India as one moderating factor in 
managing the growing power and influence of China. 
India does not perceive itself as part of an effort to contain China, and it is 
unlikely that the two countries will engage in overt hostilities over their border 
dispute. However, as in Sino-Japanese relations, suspicions and fundamental dif-
ferences remain. These will sustain the "quiet competition." It is unclear as to 
what developments or circumstances would lead to open rivalry and confronta-
tion. As with the Sino-Japanese relationship, the future state of Sino-Indian rela-
tions will hinge on domestic developments in both countries, how they work out 
their border dispute and other differences, how they adjust to each other's quest 
for greater international status and role in the region and the world, and their re-
lationship with other major powers, especially the United States. 
Quiet Competition, Strategic Flux, and Uncertainty 
From the preceding discussion it is evident that the sustained rise of Asian 
powers would have implications for system structure and security dynamics in 
Asia. Competing interests deriving from positional considerations and competing 
visions for organizing the region, as well as historically grounded suspicion make 
for apprehension and mistrust in almost all significant bilateral relationships. At 
the same time despite perceptions of long-range threats and rivalries, there is as 
yet no firm basis for the development of strategic fault lines comparable to the 
Soviet-American confrontation or the Sino-Soviet conflict during the Cold War. 
Except for the U.S.-Japan security alliance, there is no other firm line of amity. 
All other major power bilateral relationships have elements of cooperation, com-
petition, and conflict. 
Quiet strategic competition is already visible in Sino-American, Sino-Indian, 
and Sino-Japanese relations. As China continues growing its power and influence, 
Sino-American relations are likely to become more competitive. At the same time 
there are few scenarios that could lead to open strategic confrontation between 
the two countries. Both countries, however, will seek to quietly restructure re-
gional relationships and institutions (realist, liberal, and sociological) to enhance 
their own power and influence and constrain that of the other. This is also likely 
to be the case in Sino-Indian relations and in Sino-Japanese relations. 
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It is difficult to define the "eventual" configuration of major power relations 
with certainty. Many outcomes are possible. One is Sino-American ideological and 
military confrontation that leads to an alliance of democracies (United Sta~es, Ja-
pan, Australia, and India), with China and Russia drawing closer. This will be an 
extension of the present quiet competition scenario. For such a pattern of relations 
to materialize, all three bilateral relationships discussed in this section would have to 
be in a downward spiral with India willing to join (de facto or de jure) the U.S.-led 
;illiance system. Despite the rhetoric of the Bush administration, ideology is not the 
driving force in U.S. policy toward Asia. For its part, China is not committed to 
an ideology or vision that that would mobilize broad support in Asia in a confron-
tation with the United States. Further, except perhaps the conflict across the Tai-
wan Strait, there is little possibility of direct military confrontation between them. 
Other plausible outcomes include an alignment of China, Russia, and India against 
the United States and Japan or a balance-of-power system directed at China or the 
United States. The developments that would trigger the formation of such systems 
remain distant and unclear. It is possible to colliure up further outcomes, including 
a concert of major powers, a United States-Japan-China triangle, a United States-
China-India triangle, and so forth, but none of these would have a self-sustaining 
dynamic that could form the basis for durable regional strategic formation. 
An informal, loose balance-of-power system in which strategic competition 
becomes more prominent, but still below the surface and not specifically directed 
at any particular state, and with the implicit purpose of preventing domination 
of Asia by any one power appears a more likely outcome. The United States will 
remain a central player in that system, but American dominance will be reduced. 
China's power and influence will increase significantly, and the power and influ-
ence of Japan, India, and Russia would also increase. Such a system will prevent 
American and Chinese hegemony and enhance the flexibility and leverage of Ja-
pan and India. Whatever the outcome, it appears likely that strategic competition 
would become a more significant feature, and Sino-American interaction will be 
the primary security dynamic in Asia that interconnects other major powers. 
A main conclusion to draw is that strategic relations among the major powers 
in the Asian security region are in a state of flux and likely to be so for a con-
siderable time. Making for strategic uncertainty, such a situation encourages a 
tendency to seek security through multiple strategies that emphasize engagement, 
cooperation, and competition (internal and external balancing including hedging) 
to guard against unanticipated developments. In this context, major powers are 
likely to develop military capabilities, including nuclear arsenals with multiple 
purposes to avoid undesirable outcomes and protect their long-range strategic au-
tonomy as well as to deal with specific immediate threats, contingencies, and 
policy priorities. Military capabilities and strategies will have to deal with an ar-
ray oflong- and short-range security concerns. 
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Economic Overlay and Complex Interdependence 
Strategic interaction among major powers will also be influenced by the high 
priority accorded to economic growth and development in Asian countries, their 
economic dynamism, and growing economic interdependence among them and 
with the rest of the world. Although the implications of economic dynamism 
and interdependence are not straightforward, the net effect would be to produce 
a more complicated strategic picture in which traditional security interests are 
tempered by the priority accorded to economic growth. The intersection of eco-
nomic and traditional security interests would make for less clear and crosscutting 
lines of amity and enmity. The deep interest in a stable environment increases the 
incentives for states to avoid strategic confrontation and war. States may still seek 
to alter the status quo in their favor but through political, economic, and diplo-
matic means with military force held in the background. Strategic competition 
will remain below the surface. 
By affecting state strength and capacity, and by affecting patterns of trade, fi-
nancial flows, production, and related issues, economic power can mitigate or re-
inforce security concerns. As observed earlier, sustained economic growth in large 
countries is a key driver of structural change in Asia. Sustained growth will also 
provide Asian countries with resources to build strong military capabilities and 
capacity in other areas. Their economic power (foreign aid, loans, investment by 
sovereign wealth funds, etc.) and other means could be deployed to competitively 
pursue foreign and security policy goals, including milieu goals. They could also 
be deployed to promote cooperation and build a regional community. 
It has been argued that economic interdependence can decrease or at least re-
duce the incentives for conflict (McMillan 1997). Several propositions have been 
advanced in support of this argument. One is that the growing salience of capi-
tal as a factor of production and its increasing mobility decreases the incentives 
for conquest of territory and increases interest in peace and good government 
(Hirschman 1977). Second, it is argued that a high level of commercial interac-
tion produces peace because it is in the self-enlightened interest of affected states. 
Economic disruption because of war would be costly to all parties (Rosecrance 
1986). Third, the principles, norms, rules, procedures, and organizations estab-
lished to facilitate smooth economic interaction also foster rule-governed be-
havior in other areas, advancing stability and predictability. A domestic-level 
argument is that international trade would bring about a redistribution of do-
mestic political power in favor of those who benefit from international commerce 
and work against those who rely on military power and war for their influence 
(Solingen 1998). The redistribution of power also empowers actors and issues that 
could make the political system more open, accountable, and democratic. Here 
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the economic interdependence pathway to peace merges with democratic peace 
or republican liberalism. 
Those who counterargue that the benef1ts of economic interdependence ;nay 
not be equally shared contest the argument that economic interdependence can 
reduce conflict and contribute to peace (Waltz 1979). Because of the inequality 
and dependency it creates, increased economic interaction may actually increase 
the potential for conflict. Another counterargument is that there is no connection 
between commercial activity that is conducted by individuals and corporations, 
and matters of war and peace that are the preserve of the state. Considerations of 
politics and power trump commercial matters when it comes to certain .core issues 
like territory, national identity, and sovereignty. In these situations, even high 
levels of economic specialization and interdependence have not prevented inter-
national military conflict. In certain cases, political and strategic considerations 
have prevented mutually beneficial economic interaction. 
Evidence can be found in Asia for the competing propositions. Economic 
growth and national modernization are very high priorities for nearly all Asian 
states. Their own growth as well as that of other countries in the region, the aspira-
tion to become a developed country quickly, and the belief that economic growth 
holds the key to greater international position and influence as well as to address 
domestic challenges to sustain regime and government legitimacy all interact to 
produce an addiction to growth and a virtuous cycle. The high priority accorded 
to economic growth through participation in the global economy strongly argues 
for a stable international environment. It competes with and tempers traditional 
security priorities even in acute situations like that across the Taiwan Strait. 
Economic interaction among major powers has grown despite strategic sus-
picion, competition, and military tension. Bilateral economic relations between 
the United States and China have burgeoned (from US$4-9 billion in 1980 to 
US$289 billion in 2005); the two countries are highly interdependent (in 2006 
China was the second largest trading partner for the United States, and the latter 
was the top trading partner for China). Likewise, trade between India and China 
is increasing dramatically (though from a small base). Despite deep suspicion and 
competition for status and influence, the high level of economic interdependence 
between China and Japan continues. On the other hand, strategic considerations 
have obstructed otherwise mutually beneficial economic relations between Paki-
stan and India. A high level of economic interdependence has not prevented a 
rapid deterioration of political and strategic relations between Japan and China or 
transformed or resolved the conflict between China and Taiwan. However, eco-
nomic consideration has been a significant factor in stabilizing the conflict across 
the Taiwan Strait. And economic incentives are a key component of the effort to 
resolve the North Korean nuclear problem and integrate North Korea into the 
international community. 
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Economic growth can reinforce as well as temper strategic competition among 
major powers. Economic interdependence has produced cooperation, competi-
tion, and tension in bilateral relations among them. This is evident in the benefits 
and tensions arising from the high level of economic interaction between the 
United States and China. It is not possible to evaluate the competing arguments 
with evidence from Asia in an overview chapter. However, it is not unreason-
able to assert that the high priority accorded to economic development creates a 
vested interest in peace and stability. Increasing economic interdependence can 
create alternative lines of interaction and institutions that may modify or mitigate 
traditional security concerns and lines of enmity and foster rule-governed behav-
ior that enhances predictability and stability. Generally, economic dynamism and 
growing economic interdependence make for a more complex strategic picture 
than painted by traditional security concerns. They have and are likely to further 
contribute to the development of a complex interdependence situation in Asia, 
which simultaneously supports cooperation, competition, and conflict. A complex 
interdependence situation increases the cost and decreases the incentives for overt 
use of force to resolve differences and disputes. 
Evolutionary and Peaceful Systemic Change 
Upon the termination of the Cold War, several analysts deploying the general 
theories of neorealism and neoliberalism, drawing on Europe's history, and em-
phasizing the institutional weaknesses and security challenges confronting Asia 
envisioned a dangerous region in which rivalry, power balancing, and conflict 
would be endemic (Buzan and Segal 1994; Friedberg 1993-94). Continuing this 
line of argument and positing the relatively peaceful 1990s as an anomaly, John 
Mearsheimer (2001) argues that the benign power structure (a consequence of 
inertia and low cost) and relative peace in Northeast Asia are not sustainable. 
Positing one decade of experience as too short, he argues that the 199o's decade 
is not a good indicator of the future. Continued U.S. involvement in Northeast 
Asia in his view is the key to peace and security in Northeast Asia. That would 
be contingent upon whether there will be a potential regional hegemon that the 
United States must help contain. If China does not become a hegemon, he as-
serts the United States would pull out. With Japan replacing the United States, 
the Northeast Asia system would become less stable due to more intense secu-
rity competition linked to problems associated with Japan. If China does become 
a potential hegemon, Northeast Asia's multipolar system would become unbal-
anced, and the United States would retain forces to contain China. He advocates 
a shift in U.S. strategy from engagement to containment and a policy that would 
prevent China's economic growth. 
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Resting on a thin and contestable empirical base, such analysis suffers short-
comings in logic and prescription. The system in Northeast Asia in the 1990s was 
not multipolar. Counting Russia as a pole in Northeast Asia in the 1990s is h,ighly 
questionable. The United States clearly was the predominant power. Incomplete 
unipolarity or hegemony would be a more accurate description and analytically 
useful conception (Mastanduno 2003). The contention that the United States 
would pull out if China does not become a potential hegemon is not supported by 
two decades of post-Cold War experience. Further, would it not be in the U.S. 
interest to stay and sustain a favorable balance of power that serves its purpose in 
an important region than simply relinquish a favorable position because there is 
no one to contain? Great powers do not only balance or contain another great 
power. They also pursue milieu goals (constructing social, political, security, and 
. economic arrangements and institutions) to entrench their dominant position, en-
hance their authority, and advance their national interests. What would it take 
.. fur China to be considered a potential hegemon? How long will this take? What 
happens till then? If it takes several decades for China to become a hegemon, 
would the United States pull out and then return to contain a hegemonic China? 
On policy prescription, is it within the power of the United States to start and 
stop China's economic growth? Can the United States slow China's economic 
· growth without undermining the global economic system, which underpins its 
own power and influence? What would be the consequence of a protectionist 
world that could result from such a policy? Though simple and attractive, analysis 
and prescription based solely on a theory of offensive realism suffers serious short-
comings, is dangerous, and could be self-fulfilling. 
Contrary to the "ripe for rivalry thesis," I had argued earlier that Asia has en-
joyed relative peace and a high level of prosperity since the late 1970s (Alagappa 
2.003a, 2003b). The long peace in Asia started in 1979 well before the termination 
of the Cold War. Despite periodic political and economic crises and setbacks, and 
· military tensions and clashes, there has not been a major war in Asia since I979· 
. The 1999 Kargil conflict came close, but that conflict was deliberately limited in 
purpose, geography, and military action. The long peace in Asia is now almost 
three decades old and cannot be considered an anomaly. The U.S. contribution 
to peace and security in Asia is certainly important, but it is not the only factor. 
Peace, security, and prosperity in Asia in the last three decades rested on several 
other pillars as well, including the consolidation of Asian countries as modern 
states, their increased capacity to defend themselves, increased ability to partake 
in regional and global arrangements in rule making and implementation, growing 
acceptance in Asia of the political status quo, and deep interest in a wide range of 
Asian countries in preserving peace and stability (Alagappa 2003b). Asia has been 
transformed from a region of turmoil and numerous hot wars (many of which 
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were waged by or with the support of external powers) to a relatively peaceful and 
prosperous region that has become a core world region. 
The critical question is will this continue in light of the anticipated systemic 
change (change in the distribution of power as well as interaction change) an-
ticipated from the rise of Asian powers? Much will hinge on the nature and pace 
of change. I argue that systemic change in Asia will be incremental, evolution-
ary, and relatively peaceful; revolutionary change through hegemonic war is un-
likely.15 Several reasons underlie my claim. First, increase in the power of the 
Asian countries including China will be gradual and likely to suffer reversals. 
There is no guarantee that China will realize its potential or that the United 
States will irreversibly decline' or disengage from Asia. Although China's military 
power is increasing, it has limited regional force projection capability and has no 
significant global military capability. It appears unlikely to come close to match-
ing that of the United States in the next two decades (Shambaugh 2005a). Second, 
although China may seek to alter the status quo to better serve its interests and 
enhance its influence, the disjuncture between power, prestige, and rules is not 
severe. An ascending China feels constrained by U.S. predominance, but it is also 
a beneficiary of the present international system. China does not want to be seen 
as a revisionist power, and Chinese behavior does not meet the definition of a 
revisionist power (Johnston 2003). The Chinese authorities, through the strategy 
of "peaceful rise," seek to cooperate with the United States and other major pow-
ers in addressing certain common international problems (Goldstein 2005). Such 
cooperation has helped keep China's economic development on track, enhanced 
Beijing's economic and diplomatic power and influence in Asia and the world, and 
helps constrain the United States. Third, except for the Taiwan situation, there is 
no issue that can make for a serious confrontation between the United States and 
China. Fourth, Beijing suffers a legitimacy deficit in the region that flows from 
its behavior in the early phase of the Cold War and from uncertainty as to how an 
ascendant China would use its newfound power. Although it has been successful 
in its policy of good neighborliness, it still has a long way to go in developing a 
strong claim to legitimacy for international governance. Finally, the Chinese ap-
proach to international governance is still reactive and pragmatic. Beijing has yet 
to fully develop ideas, values, and mechanisms that can harmonize its interests 
with that of other Asian powers and build a common worldview to organize the 
region on the basis of a common vision. These considerations imply that change 
will be incremental and relatively peaceful though not tension-free. As later dis-
cussion will show, circumscription of the role of force and the increasing salience 
of military force in the deterrence, defense, and assurance roles further underscore 
my claim that system or systemic change through major war is unlikely in Asia. 
Success in peaceful change, however, hinges on the ability of the rising power 
to bring pressure on the dominant power, the willingness of the dominant power 
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to make concessions, and the ability of the two countries to resolve and harmo-
nize differences in values and interests (Carr 1951). Through policies of engage-
ment, successive U.S. administrations have sought to accommodate and integrate 
China into the international system; and China is becoming a key member of 
the international community in the economic arena and in several other areas, 
including arms control regimes (Kent 2007; Medeiros 2007). It is keen to be seen 
as a responsible power. However, there are also areas of serious disagreement es-
pecially in the political and security arenas. Except for the Taiwan situation, the 
differences are not so fundamental as to lead to major war. In a situation of incre-
mental change, differences and disputes among major powers are likely to be re-
solved through bargaining, coercive diplomacy, and in rare cases through limited 
war. Full-scale war is highly costly and unlikely. 
The Changing Role of Force in Asia 
Military power is widely viewed as an important national asset and a key in-
strument of policy in the Asian security region. By devoting a substantial share 
of state revenue to defense, nearly all countries seek to develop credible military 
forces to ensure national security and, in the case of major states, to shape the 
regional security environment in line with their policy priorities. Ongoing and 
anticipated changes in the strategic environment and in military technology are 
stimulating modernization of military forces and development of new military 
capabilities, including in the nuclear arena. At the same time, the role of force in 
Asian international politics is becoming circumscribed and changing, with deter-
rence, defense, and assurance functions assuming greater salience. 
Salience of Military Power 
Nearly every country in the Asian security region devotes a significant per-
centage of government revenue to modernizing and developing its military ca-
pabilities. See Table I-2 for an overview of defense expenditures by countries in 
the Asian security region. Table I-3 provides details of the fifteen major defense 
spenders in the world. The United States accounts for about 46 percent of total 
world spending on defense, and that exceeds the combined total of the next four-
teen countries on the list. With high rates of economic growth, Asian countries, 
especially the larger ones, are also able to allocate more resources to defense. 
Military modernization programs are underway in all major states. Seeking 
to maintain an armed force without peer, the United States is transforming its 
military to meet four primary challenges: irregular challenges (defeating terrorist 
networks), catastrophic challenges (preventing acquisition or use ofWMD and de-
fending the homeland), disruptive challenges (shaping choices of countries at stra-
tegic crossroads), and traditional interstate security challenges (National Defense 
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TABLE I-2 
Difmse Expenditures in the Asian Security Region (1995-2005) 
(in billion USs at constant 2003 prices and exchange rates, for calendar years if not stated otherwise) 
Country 1995 2000 2005 
Expenditure %GOP Expenditure %GDP Expenditure 
United States" 357.382 3.8 342.172 3.1 504.638 
Russiab 21.700 4.4 19.100 3.7 31.100 
China' 15.000 1.8 23.800 2.0 44.300 
India 12.550 2.7 17.697 3.1 22.273 
Japan 42.471 1.0 43.802 1.0 44.165 
North Koread 5.232 25.2 2.049 12.7 n.a. 
South Korea 15.476 2•.8 16.652 2.5 20.333 
Mongolia 0.020 1.6 0.028 2.4 0.030 
Taiwan 9.062 3.8 7.389 2.4 7.352 
Burma n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. 
(Myanmar)' 
Malaysia 2.055 2.8 1.677 1.7 3.120 
Thailand 3.240 2.3 1.982 1.4 2.018 
Vietnam! 0.91 4.3 2.303 7.3 n.a. 
Indonesia 2.613 1.6 2.242 1.0 3.410 
Philippines 0.885 1.4 0.853 1.1 0.865 
Singapore 3.378 4.4 4.634 4.7 5.468 
Bangladesh 0.554 1.3 0.675 1.3 0.669 
Nepal 0.049 0.8 0.063 0.9 0.175 
Pakistan 3.435 5.3 3.320 3.7 4.534 
Sri Lanka 0.863 5.3 0.904 4.5 0.612 
Iran 2.351 2.4 6.695 5.4 9.057 
Is rae~ 7.996 8.6 9.553 8.0 12.522 
from The SIPRI Military Expenditure Database 2007 available at: 
ntrp:;,rnrst.Slprt.or·g, "'""·""'" "'"'~>-.pnp. Some data are from The l\Jilitary Balance (London: Brassey's for 
for (IISS), 1996/97 and 2002/200J). 
Where IISS data were used, the figures are expressed in constant U.S. dollars of the year. 
for the United States are for financial years rather than calendar years. 
for Russia are estimated total military expenditures. 
























for North Korea are from The Military Balance 1996197 and 2002/zooj. 
for Burma are not represented in constant U.S. dollar terms because of the extrerne variation in 
rates between the kyat and the U.S. dollar. 
are from The Military Balance 1996l97 and 2ooz/zooJ. 
for Israel include military aid from the United States ofUSu billion annually. 
Strategy 2005; Quadrennial Defense Review 2006). Since the early 1990s Beijing 
has accelerated defense modernization. In addition to building military capabil-
ity focused on the Taiwan conflict, China is developing a strong modern navy to 
secure sea lines of communications and to project power, and it is developing its 
nuclear arsenal and space capabilities to enhance the effectiveness of its strategic 
deterrent (Shambaugh 2005a). India's military modernization is aimed at restoring 
conventional superiority over Pakistan, building a strategic deterrent capability 
against China, and building a regional force projection capability in support of 
its major power aspiration (Gill 2005). Japan's military modernization is designed 
to support a more proactive international role, including an expanded military 
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TABLE 1-3 
Major Military Spender Countries in 2006 
(USs at constant 2005 prices and exchange rates) 
Military expenditure in MER dollar terms Military expenditure in 
PPP dollar terms" 
Rank Coumry Spending Spending World share(%) Rank Country Spending 
($billion) per capita (J) (J billion) 
Spending Population 
1 United States 528.7 1,756 46 5 1 United States 528.7 
2 Britain 59.2 990 5 1 2 China [188.2] 
3 France 53.1 875 5 1 3 India . 114.3 
4 China [49.5] [37] [4] 20 4 Russia [82.8] 
5 Japan 43.7 341 4 2 5 Britain 51.4 
Subtotal top 5 734.2 63 29 Subtotal top 5 965.5 
6 Germany 37.0 447 3 1 6 France 46.6 
7 Russia [34.7] [244] [3] 2 7 Saudi Arabia"·' 36.4 
8 Italy 29.9 514 3 1 8 Japan 35.2 
9 Saudi Arabia"·' 29.0 1,152 3 9 Brazil 32.0 
:. 10 India 23.9 21 2 17 10 Germany 31.2 
Subtotal top 10 888.7 77 50 Subtotal top 10 1,147.0 
11 South Korea 21.9 455 2 1 11 South Korea 30.1 
12 Australia' 13.8 676 1 12 Iranb 28.6 
13 Canada< 13.5 414 1 13 Italy 28.6 
14 Brazil 13.4 71 1 3 14 Turkey 20.2 
15 Spain 12.3 284 1 1 15 Pakistan 15.6 
Subtotal top 15 963.7 83 56 Subtotal top 15 1,270.2 
World 1,158 177 100 100 World 
souRcE: Stockholm International Peace Research Institute, SIPRI Yearbook 2007. 
MER = market exchange rate; PPP = purchasing power parity; [ ] Estimated ftgure 
• The figures in PPP dollar terms are converted at PPP rates (for 2005), calculated by the World Bank, based on com-
parisons of gross national product. . . . 
b Data for Iran and Saudi Arabia include expenditure for public order and safety and mtght be shght overesumates. 
'The populations of Australia, Canada and Saudi Arabia each constitute less than 0.5% oft he total world population. 
role in the region and beyond (Hughes 2005). Modernization would increase the 
strategic military capabilities of these countries, although the Asian countries also 
face technological, organizational, and human resource challenges in successfully 
implementing modernization programs. 
National military assets figure prominently in the conflicts across the Taiwan 
Strait, on the Korean peninsula, and over Kashmir. In Asia, force is an option 
as well in the numerous border and other territorial disputes on land and at sea. 
Naval and air intrusions into disputed- territories at sea and military responses to 
such intrusions have occurred in recent times even among major states (China and 
Japan). And both government and insurgent forces in domestic conflicts in China, 
India, Pakistan, Indonesia, Burma, Thailand, Philippines, Sri Lanka, and until re-
cently Nepal deploy military force routinely and at times massively. 
In addition to immediate security concerns, military modernization and de-
velopment of new capabilities are also driven by considerations relating to the 
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balance of power in the region. To preserve its dominant position, Washington 
seeks to maintain a military force without peer. China is increasing its military 
power and reach with a view to enhancing its national power and position in 
Asia and to alter the regional balance of power in its favor (Shambaugh 2005a). 
Likewise, military modernization and development in India are driven not only 
by the ongoing conflict with Pakistan but also by balance-of-power and strategic 
autonomy considerations related to China (Gill 2005). Japan's move to become a 
normal state and to strengthen its military capability and the alliance with the 
United States is driven both by immediate concerns as well as to prevent Chinese 
dominance in the region (Hughes 2005). 
Lack tf International Regulation 
Collective management of force is not a viable option in the Asian security 
region at present. Zealously guarding their sovereignty, the United States and the 
Asian powers do not accept constraints on their autonomy. There is no North At-
lantic Treaty Organization (NATO)-like collective defense organization in Asia. 
The United States presents its bilateral military alliances in the region as a public 
good for regional peace and security. The primary purpose of that alliance system, 
however, is to serve U.S. national interests and those of its allies. Non-allies that 
feel threatened by the United States do not see the alliance system as a public good. 
Ad hoc concerts may form from time to time to manage specific issues. There are 
few bilateral and multilateral arms control measures restricting the possession and 
use of force in the region. Those that exist are designed primarily to build confi-
dence or prevent accidental outbreaks of hostilities rather than to limit or regulate 
the use of force. Most Asian countries also score poorly on issues of accountability 
and transparency. There is no regional mechanism to advance these concerns. 
Military power in Asia remains very much a national asset that suffers little in the 
form of international regulation of its possession, deployment, and use. 
Circumscription of Force 
Despite this, the role of force in Asian international politics is becoming more 
limited due to a number of developments. First, the traditional need for force to 
protect the territorial integrity of states has declined in importance. With few 
exceptions (Taiwan, North Korea, and South Korea) state survival is not prob-
lematic. The Asian political map is for the most part internationally accepted, 
although some boundaries are still in dispute. Such disputes are being settled 
through negotiations or shelved in the interest of promoting better bilateral rela-
tions (Wang 2003). 
Second, the political, diplomatic, strategic, military, and economic cost of us-
ing force has increased dramatically. Over the past several decades, a normative 
framework has developed in Asia that delegitimizes the use of force to invade and 
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occupy another country or to annex territory that is internationally recognized as 
belonging to another state. The use of force to invade and occupy another country 
or to annex territory will incur high costs. For example, if China were to invade 
Taiwan without serious provocation, it can expect civil and military resistance in 
Taiwan, U.S. military intervention, international condemnation, and a setback 
to its image as a responsible power. Such action would also incur huge economic 
costs resulting from international and domestic disruptions. Unless military ac-
tion were swift and surgical, it would also result in substantial physical damage 
that would only increase as Asian countries continued to modernize and urban-
ize. Further, military action that is not successful can have negative domestic 
·. political consequences as well. 
Third, most Asian countries benefit from participation in the regional and 
global capitalist marketplace. The 1997-98 financial crisis sensitized Asian coun-
. tries to the vagaries and negative consequences of globalization but did not turn 
them away from liberalization and participation in the global economy. Preserving 
international stability has become a key goal of major powers. Economic growth, 
modernization, and growing economic interdependence have increased the cost 
of the force option and restrained the behavior of states even when major political 
issues are at stake, as for example in cross-Strait relations. Economic interdepen-
dence does not close the force option in all cases, but the high costs of economic 
disruption can restrain military action. Further, force is no longer relevant for 
the attainment of economic goals such as access to resources, labor, and markets. 
Energy security, for example, is sought through the market, national stockpiling, 
and sourcing arrangements. 
Finally, resolution of existing disputes through the use of force is not practi-
cal. Except for the United States, none of the Asian states can marshal the neces-
sary military power to impose a settlement by force. The experience in Iraq and 
Afghanistan suggests that even the United States suffers limitations and that the 
use of force carries much risk. These considerations explain the reluctance of the 
United States to undertake preventive action against North Korea, the reluctance 
of China to carry out its threat of using force to unify Taiwan with the PRC, and 
the continuing stalemate in the India-Pakistan conflict over Kashmir. Force may 
·still be used in these cases, but the attendant strategic, political, diplomatic, and 
economic costs and risks are high. 
Thus, despite the many conflicts, substantial increases in defense expenditures, 
and the acquisition of more lethal capabilities, there has not been a full-scale war 
in Asia since 1979. The 1999 Kargil conflict came close, but India scrupulously 
limited the war initiated by Pakistan to territory occupied by Pakistani troops on 
the Indian side of the line of control. Over the past two decades, resort to the use 
of force in the Asian security region has been limited to border dashes, militant 
insurgencies, and occasional clashes at sea where the danger of escalation is low. 
7Z MUTHIAH ALAGAPPA 
Force has also been used in a few cases in the coercive diplomacy role-as in the 
PRC's attempt to influence Taiwan's presidential election in 1996 and Pakistan's 
attempt to coerce India to the negotiating table on the Kashmir issue. 
Deterrence, Difense, and Assurance to the Fore 
The primary mission of the armed forces in most Asian countries is the pro-
tection of territorial integrity and populations from external threats, not military 
aggression and conquest. Deterrence and defense are the primary roles in carrying 
out the protection mission. Even in the most serious regional conflict across the 
Taiwan Strait the primary role of force from China's perspective is to dissuade Tai-
wan from declaring independence and to deter the United States from intervening 
in the event of hostilities. From the perspective of the United States, the purpose 
is to dissuade China and deter its forceful absorption of Taiwan, and, within lim-
its, assure and control Taiwan. On the Korean peninsula, force is most relevant 
in the defense and deterrence functions. And in the India-Pakistan conflict, with 
growing recognition of the limitations of the offensive role of force including co-
ercive diplomacy, deterrence appears to be becoming more important. 
Assurance of allies is an important function of military power. A primary role of 
American alliances and forward deployment in Asia is to assure allies (Japan, Aus- . • 
tralia, South Korea, and Taiwan) and prevent them from pursuing undesired capa-
bilities or engaging in undesired actions. Only the United States has deployed force 
in preventive and intervention roles to dislodge unacceptable regimes, to stop gross 
violation of human rights, or to prevent the acquisition ofWMD. Asian countries 
do not support, or only reluctantly support, such actions. Even the United States 
has been reluctant since the Vietnam War to engage in such military action in Asia 
proper. Evidence over the last three decades supports the contention that the role 
of military force in Asian international politics is becoming more limited and that 
deterrence, defense, and assurance functions are becoming more prominent. How 
would nuclear weapons and ballistic missiles, and the introduction ofBMD, affect 
this trend? These and related questions are investigated in the country chapters in 
Part II of this study. 
Notes 
1. The ensuing discussion of the colonial and Cold War eras is drawn from Alagappa 
(1998). 
2. On the use of the Internet by terrorist groups, see Lim zoos. 
3. For details about the Khan network, see Carnegie Endowment for International 
Peace, "A. Q. Khan Nuclear Chronology," Issue BriefS (8), September 7, 2005. 
4. Fravel (2005) argues that regime insecurity best explains China's many compromises 
in its territorial disputes. 
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s. On possible scenarios and implications of violent resolution or irresolution of the 
· Taiwan conflict for China and the United States, see Cliff and Shlapak (2007). 
6. See, for example, Vogel (1979). 
7· On soft balancing, see Paul (zoo6). 
8. See, for example, Sutter (zoos); Lampton (zoos); and Elwell, Labonte, and Morrison 
9. For an assessment of the China threat, see Ross (zoos). 
ro. The "responsible stakeholder" phrase was used by Deputy Secretary of State Rob-
ert B. Zoellick (see Zoellick zoos). 
rr. On China's regional strategy see Zhang and Tang (2005). 
rz. See Chapter s by Chu and Rong this volume. 
13. A revolutionary change in Japan's military capability and international security 
however, appears unlikely. See Mochizuki (zoos). 
14. Some argue that it is a one-sided rivalry since China matters far more for India 
than vice versa, and India on its own is not taken seriously by China (Shirk 2004). Others 
counter that Chinese indifference to India is feigned and that Beijing has a deliberate strat-
egy that seeks indirectly to limit Indian influence to South Asia (Tellis 2004). 
15. On incremental and revolutionary change, see Gilpin 198r. 
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